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Pro Se Litigants at the Summary
Judgment Stage: Is Ignorance of the
Law an Excuse?
BY JESSICA CASE*
It is illogical and unfair to tell a man "everyone is charged with knowing
the law, " and "ignorance of the law is no excuse, " when we send him to
prison for violating a law he did not know about.., and then when in
prison he sues someone, to say he is not charged with knowing the law
governing procedure in his own lawsuit until we send him a personal
explanation.'
INTRODUCTION
O ver the past decade increasing numbers of pro se litigants have
crowded federal dockets, forcing courts and scholars to take a
closer look at the rights of indigent and unrepresented litigants.3At the
core of the American judicial system is the right to "equal justice under
* J.D. expected 2003, University of Kentucky.
Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 967-68 (9th Cir. 1998) (Kleinfeld, J.,
dissenting).
2 See generally Donald H. Zeigler & Michele G. Hermann, The Invisible
Litigant: An Inside View of Pro Se Actions in the Federal Courts, 47 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 157 (1972). See also Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)
(stating that pro se claims comprised twenty-five percent of the cases on their
docket).
3 See generally JONA GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF PRO
SE LITIGATION: A REPORT AND GUIDEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND COURT MANAGERS
49 (1998); Julie M. Bradlow, Procedural Due Process Rights of Pro Se Civil
Litigants, 55 U. CHL L. REV. 659 (1988); Russell Engler, And Justice for
All-Including the UnrepresentedPoor: Revisiting theRoles ofJudges, Mediators,
and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 1987 (1999); Joseph McLaughlin, An Extension
of the Right ofAccess: The Pro Se Litigant's Right to Notification of the Require-
ments ofthe Summary JudgmentRule, 55 FORDHAML.REV. 1109(1987); Deborah
L. Rhode, The Constitution of Equal Citizenship for a Good Society: Access to
Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 1785 (2001); Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 2.
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law."4 On a procedural level, the phrase has generally been taken to mean
"equal access to justice," and thus equal access to law.' As federal courts
struggle to adhere to this fundamental concept in accommodating pro se
litigants, the question becomes what is equal access to law? Does ensuring
equal access to pro se litigants entail additional assistance from courts that
is not given to represented litigants? Or should equal access embody true
equality, with all litigants being held to the same procedural standards?
A pro se litigant is defined as "[o]ne who represents oneself in a court
proceeding without the assistance of a lawyer."6 The right to represent
oneself in civil matters is ensured in federal court7 and has been enforced
strictly While the right to counsel is mandated in criminal cases,9 there is
no inherent right to counsel in the civil context." Thereby, pro se claims
have grown to comprise a substantial percentage of the federal court
caseload," becoming a heavy burden to the federal courts.
12
4The concept of "equaljustice under law" provides the underpinnings for both
the Equal Protection and the Due Process Clauses. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson,
463 U.S. 248, 265 (1983) (citation omitted) ("The concept of equal justice under
law requires the State to govern impartially. The sovereign may not draw
distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are irrelevant to
a legitimate governmental objective."); United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 624
n.6 (8th Cir. 1999) ("The Fifth Amendment due process clause incorporates the
principles of equal justice under the law applicable to the federal government.").
5 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., After Legal Aid is Abolished, 2 J. INST. FOR
STUDY LEGAL ETHics 375, 386 (1999); Stephen L. Pepper, Access to What?, 2 J.
INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 269, 272 (1999); Jack B. Weinstein, The Poor's
Right to Equal Access to the Courts, 13 CONN. L. REV. 651, 655 (1981).
6 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1237 (7th ed. 1999).
728 U.S.C. § 1654 (1994) ("In all courts of the United States the parties may
plead and conduct their own cases personally.. ").
'See Schilling v. Walworth County Park & Planning Comm'n, 805 F.2d 272,
276 (7th Cir. 1986) (failure to obtain counsel may not be held against the pro se
litigant); Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 93-94 (2d Cir. 1983) (requirement that a
pro se litigant must answer a complaint through counsel violates the litigant's
statutory right); O'Reilly v. N.Y. Times Co., 692 F.2d 863, 867 (2d Cir. 1982) (the
right to appear pro se is a valuable right not to be dishonored by courts).
9 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 64-70 (1932).
0 See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27-31 (198 1) (holding that
counsel be appointed in civil cases only when failure to do so would be fundamen-
tally unfair).
" See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
12 See Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1119-20 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating
frivolous pro se litigation wastes judicial resources and impairs the chance of
success ofmeritorious claims); Urban v. United Nations 768 F.2d 1497, 1499-1500
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Many scholars have endorsed the idea of courts taking a paternalistic
view toward unrepresented litigants, 13 and in Haines v. Kerner,4 the
Supreme Court held that the pleadings of pro se litigants are to be viewed
with some leniency. 5 But just how far should the courts go, in fact how far
can they go, before the balance is tipped in favor of the pro se litigant, thus
defeating truly equal access?
The question of how far a court's helping hand should extend to pro se
litigants is perhaps most pertinent at the summary judgment stage. During
summary judgment, one party, under the strictures and guidance of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56,16 submits a motion requesting
that the court rule in its favor as a matter of law. 7 The moving party has
the burden of establishing the absence of an issue of material fact. 8 A court
will only grant this motion when the pleadings and affidavits submitted
to the court convince the judge that no genuine issue of material fact
exists. 9
The summary judgment juncture is critical for any litigant because a
ruling in favor of the party requesting summary judgment represents an
adjudication on the merits" and precludes the possibility of a trial on the
issues absent a successful appeal.2 Summary judgment can be particularly
difficult for a pro se litigant because the requirements of the rule are
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (discussing pro se litigants flooding federal circuits with
"meritless, fanciful claims" that require the courts to expend time protecting the
administration of justice); In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1259 (2d Cir.
1984) (discussing pro se litigants abusing legal system to harass defendants);
Johnson v. Baskerville, 568 F. Supp. 853, 855 (E.D. Va. 1983) (discussing the
burden on the court system due to frivolous pro se litigation).
'3 See, e.g., Bradlow, supra note 3, at 660; McLaughlin, supra note 3, at 1109;
Rhode, supra note 3, at 1785.
'4 Haines v. Kemer, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (per curiam).
'5 1d. at 520-21.
16 FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
17Id.
'8 See Cedillo v. Int'l Ass'n of Bridge & Structural Iron Workers, 603 F.2d 7,
10 (7th Cir. 1979); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 668
(4th ed. 1983).
19 See, e.g., Jensen v. Klecker, 648 F.2d 1179, 1182 (8th Cir. 1981); Cubbage
v. Averett 626 F.2d 1307, 1308 (5th Cir. 1980); Keiserv. Coliseum Properties, Inc.
614 F.2d 406, 410 (5th Cir. 1980); Jones v. Halekulani Hotel, Inc., 557 F.2d 1308,
1310 (9th Cir. 1977); Reiverv. Murdoch & Walsh, P.A., 625 F. Supp. 998, 1003-
04 (D. Del. 1985); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (c).
20 See J. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 453 (3d ed. 1999).
21 Id.
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somewhat complexP and the pro se litigant may not be aware of her
obligation to submit reply affidavits.23 Therefore, federal courts are
struggling with the question of whether or not particularized summary
judgment instructions should be given to pro se litigants.24
' See generally Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1364-66 (9th Cir. 1986)
(reflects the difficulty pro se litigants have with knowing to respond to opposing
parties' motions); Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100, 102 (7th Cir. 1982) (refused
to impute knowledge of the requirement to respond to a summary judgment motion
to a prison inmate acting as apro se litigant); Madyun v. Thompson, 657 F.2d 868,
876-77 (7th Cir. 1981) (requiring notice to pro se litigants that summaryjudgment
motions require counter-affidavits).
' While the reply requirement is explicitly listed in the text of Rule 56, some
argue that a pro se litigant nevertheless remains unaware of their obligation under
the rule. See Jacobsen, 790 F.2d at 1368 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (arguing that
laymen are unable to appreciate procedural obligations); Ross v. Franzen, 777 F.2d
1216, 1219 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating "it is not realistic to impute to a [pro se litigant]
without legal background the awareness of failing to respond.., to a motion for
summary judgment.").
24 This struggle is evidenced by a split among the federal circuit courts over
whether these instructions should be given. The Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuit
Courts of Appeals have refused to require a federal district court trial judge to
inform a pro se litigant of the requirements of the summary judgment rule. See,
e.g., Beck v. Skon, 253 F.3d 330, 333 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating that while several
other circuits have required summary judgment instructions to be given to pro se
litigants, the Eighth Circuit will require a pro se litigant to respond to a motion for
summary judgment in the same way as a non pro se litigant); Martin v. Harrison
County Jail, 975 F.2d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) ("[P]articularized
additional notice of the potential consequences of a summary judgment motion...
need not be afforded a pro se litigant. The notice afforded by the Rules of Civil
Procedure and the local rules are, in our view, sufficient."); Brock v. Hendershott,
840 F.2d 339, 34243 (6th Cir. 1988) (relying on a sense of fairness for other
parties who chose counsel and must bear the risk of their attorney's mistakes, the
court adopts a rule that no special treatment will be afforded ordinary civil litigants
who proceed pro se).
The Second, Fourth, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuit Courts of
Appeals mandate that notice of summary judgment requirements be given to pro
se litigants. See, e.g., Trammell v. Coombe, No. 97-2622, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS
34073 at *5 (2d Cir. Dec. 23, 1999) ("'The failure of a district court to apprise pro
se litigants of the consequences of failing to respond to a motion for summary
judgment is ordinarily grounds for reversal."); Merila v. Johnson, No. 94-4202,
1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 7989 at *3 (10th Cir. Apr. 11, 1995) (" 'District courts
must take care to insure that pro se litigants are provided with proper notice
regarding the complex procedural issues involved in summary judgment proceed-
ings."'); Timms v. Frank, 953 F.2d 281,283-84(7th Cir. 1992) (inferring fromthe
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The great weight of scholarly and a majority ofjudicial commentary on
the subject suggests that particularized summaryjudgment instructions are
appropriate for pro se litigants.2" Based on the structure, policy, and
rules of procedure that the non-movant, when faced with a motion for summary
judgment must be given a reasonable opportunity to present counter-affidavits and
that such reasonable opportunity for a pro se litigant presupposes notice); Herron
v. Beck, 693 F.2d 125, 127 (11th Cir. 1982) (stating a court should assume proper
notice to apro se litigant); Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Cir. 1975)
(per curiam) (reversed and remanded because the pro se litigant was not notified
of his responsibilities with respect to the summary judgment filed by the opposing
party); Hudson v. Hardy, 412 F.2d 1091,1094 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ("[B]efore entering
summary judgment against appellant, the District Court, as a bare minimum, should
have provided him with fair notice of the requirements of the summary judgment
rule.").
The Ninth Circuit requires notice of summary judgment requirements for pro
se prisoner litigants only. The foremost reason for not extending the notice
requirements to an ordinary civil case was to not treat pro se litigants more
favorably than parties with attorneys. See Jacobsen, 790 F.2d at 1364.
The First Circuit has not formed a view as to whether particularized summary
judgment instructions should be given. See Hunsberger v. FBI, No. 96-1841, 1997
U.S. App. LEXIS 6516 at *5 (1st Cir. Mar. 14, 1997) ("The failure to advise
plaintiff of the Rule 56 procedures, even if erroneous (a matter as to which we
intimate no view), would thus have been harmless."). The Third Circuit, per the
author's research, has not addressed the issue of whether pro se litigants are
entitled to summary judgment instructions. However, the Third Circuit has
intimated that it affords prose litigants significant procedural leniency. See Tabron
v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153-54 n.2 (3d Cir. 1993) (pro se litigant failed to raise an
issue of contention in a timely manner. The court noted that they "have traditionally
given pro se litigants greater leeway where they have not followed the technical
rules of pleading and procedure.").
25 See, e.g., supra notes 13-15, 24 and accompanying text; see also infra notes
62-67 and accompanying text.
For more discussion on pro se litigant issues, see, for example, Russell Engler,
Out of Sight and Out of Line: The Needfor Regulation ofLawyers' Negotiations
with Unrepresented Poor Persons, 85 CAL. L. REV. 79 (1997) (concluding that
lawyers frequently violate existing ethical rules against giving advice to unrepre-
sented parties and suggests stricter enforcement of the ethical rules as well as the
passage of additional ethical rules concerning negotiations with unrepresented
parties); Kevin H. Smith, Justice forAll?: The Supreme Court's Denial of Pro Se
Petitionsfor Certiorari, 63 ALB. L. REV. 381 (1999) (concluding that the Supreme
Court's denial of paid pro se civil petitions constitutes rational judicial action in
light of both the Court's functions and the characteristics displayed by cases in
which pro se petitions are filed); Rosalie R. Young, The Search for Counsel:
Perceptions ofApplicants for Subsidized Legal Assistance, 36 BRANDEIS J. FAM.
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authority of the judicial system, and on the principles of common sense and
practicality, this Note disagrees.
All litigants deserve minimum due process rights, one of the most
meaningful of which is the opportunity to be heard, "granted at a meaning-
ful time and in a meaningful manner."26 This fundamental constitutional
right" granted to pro se litigants is protected by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure promulgated by the judiciary," and by the adversary system of
the American courts.29 The opportunity of a pro se litigant to be heard need
not be further advanced by eroding the purpose and meaning of the rules,
nor by changing the nature of the adversary system or the role ofjudges in
the nation's courts. A uniform rule providing for judicial notification of the
requirements of the summary judgment rule to pro se litigants threatens to
do both. Notification of such requirements should be left to federal district
court trial judges in their discretionary capacity and not mandated by the
courts of appeals.3"
Part I of this Note discusses the Supreme Court and federal circuit
courts of appeals' reactions to the plight of pro se litigants in general.3 Part
L. 551 (1997) (discussing author's findings after conducting fifty-one in-depth
interviews with applicants for subsidized legal assistance in Centre City, a mid-
sized northeastern city); Edward M. Holt, Student Commentary, How to Treat
"Fools ": Exploring the Duties Owed to Pro Se Litigants in Civil Cases, 25 J.
LEGAL PROF. 167 (2001) (addressing the duties owed pro se litigants pretrial, trial
and post trial and suggesting that the federal court system follow Minnesota in
developing a model for uniform treatment of pro se litigants); John Matosky, Note,
Illiterate Inmates and the Right of Meaningful Access to the Courts, 7 B.U. PUB.
INT. L.J. 295 (1998) (exploring the obstacles to providing illiterate inmates with
"meaningful access" to courts in wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Bounds
v. Smith).
26 Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 437 (1982) (quoting
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).27See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817,821(1977); Jonhson v. Avery, 393 U.S.
483, 485 (1969). The right to access to the courts is derived from the First
Amendment, see, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,428-29 (1963); Harrison
v. Springdale Water & Sewer Comm'n, 780 F.2d 1422, 1427-28 (8th Cir. 1986),
and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see, e.g., Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974); Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, 971-72
(5th Cir. 1983). This right protects a litigant's interest in using judicial processes
to attain redress of grievances. See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 825; Wolff, 418 U.S. at
579; Johnson, 393 U.S. at 485.28 See infra notes 115-45 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 185-206 and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 202-06 and accompanying text.
31 See discussion infra Part I.
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If addresses the split among the circuits and analyzes several federal
appellate court holdings regarding summary judgment instructions and pro
se litigants.32 Part II explores Federal Rule of Procedure 56 and explains
why its requirements are clear and unambiguous, thereby dissolving the
need for particularized instructions for pro se litigants.33 Part IV argues that
a rule created by the federal circuit courts of appeals mandating judicial
notification of summary judgment requirements oversteps the authority of
circuit courts to make rules for lower courts and does harm to the adversary
system by skewing the traditional and essential role of trial judges."
I. JUDICIAL REACTIONS TO PRO SE LITIGANTS
Judicial reactions to pro se issues have been varied. The Supreme Court
has stated, in dicta, that pro se litigants are to be held to the same proce-
dural requirements as represented litigants when they waive their right to
counsel.35 The Court, throughout its line of decisions addressing various
pro se concerns, has carved out only one exception to this mandate--that
pro se litigants are entitled to have their pleadings read liberally.36 The
federal circuit courts of appeals, however, oscillate in their treatment of pro
se litigants. Some of the courts take a generally paternalistic view toward
pro se litigants,37 while others indicate that they are held to the same
standards as represented litigants."
A. The Supreme Court and Pro Se Litigants: How Much Procedural
Leniency Should Be Granted?
The Supreme Court has supported a view of procedural consistency for
pro se and represented litigants alike.39 Starting from this general rule, the
32 See discussion infra Part II.
33 See discussion infra Part II.
34 See discussion infra Part IV.
35 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835-36 (1975) (pro se litigant "required
to follow all the 'ground rules' of trial procedure").36 Haines v. Kemer, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (per curiam).
37See, e.g., Maggette v. Dalsheim, 709 F.2d 800, 802 (2d Cir. 1983); Muham-
mad v. Rowe, 638 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Phillips v. United States
Bd. of Parole, 352 F.2d 711 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (per curiam); see also infra notes 80-
83 and accompanying text.
38 See, e.g., Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam);
United States v. Pinkey, 548 F.2d 305,311 (10th Cir. 1977); see also Rhode, supra
note 3, at 1805-06; infra notes 69-79 and accompanying text.
39See, e.g., Bradlow, supra note 3, at 668.
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Court has granted one exception in requiring pro se pleadings to be read in
a flexible manner.4" The general reluctance of the Court to afford any
further leniency to the pro se litigant,4 as well as the Court's general
insistence on strict compliance with procedural rules,42 supports the
argument that the procedural requirements of Rule 56 should not be
appended with a mandate of judicial provision of summary judgment
instructions to the pro se litigant.
In Faretta v. California43 the Supreme Court noted in dicta, after
inferring from the right to counsel clause in the Sixth Amendment a right
to self-representation in criminal cases, that pro se litigants are to be held
to the same procedural standards as represented litigants when they waive
the benefit of counsel." This view has been given substantial deference, not
only by the Supreme Court,45 but also by lower federal courts.46 The Court,
in McKaskle v. Wiggins,47 evinced its dedication to the Faretta standard. In
McKaskle, the Court held that unsolicited assistance from standby counsel
did not impair the prisoner-defendant's Faretta rights,4 reasoning that such
4"Id. at 671.
41 See infra notes 54-67 and accompanying text.42 See infra notes 54-67 and accompanying text.
43 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). InFaretta, the Court held that a
state could not constitutionally force a lawyer on a defendant who was literate,
competent, and understanding, and who had voluntarily exercised his informed free
will. Id. at 820-21. While the Court noted that the right to counsel in criminal
proceedings was constitutionally protected and essential to due process, the Court
also held that counsel thrust upon a defendant "is not an assistant, but a master; and
the right to make a defense is stripped of the personal character upon which the
Amendment insists." Id. at 820 (footnote omitted).
'Id. at 835 n.46 ("The right of self-representation is not a license to abuse the
dignity of the courtroom. Neither is it a license not to comply with relevant rules
of procedural and substantive law.").
41 See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984).
46 See, e.g., Andrews v. Bechtel PowerCorp., 780 F.2d 124, 140 (1st Cir. 1985)
(pro se plaintiff cannot be exempted from Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(2), forbidding a
claim of error predicated on evidence not actually offered at trial); Burgs v. Sissel,
745 F.2d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 1984) (pro se plaintiff's case dismissed with prejudice
for failure to comply with order of the court and lack of diligence in pursuing
claim); Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (pro se
plaintiff in habeas action cannot be excused from failure to take a timely appeal
under federal rules).
4"McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 168.
48 Id. at 183. The McKaskle Court distinguished the case from Faretta in that
McKaskle had been given the opportunity to represent himself which was not
meaningfully impaired by the unsolicited assistance of outside counsel. The Court
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counsel might provide the pro se litigant with needed assistance in
complying with procedural requirements since pro se status did not excuse
the litigant from normal procedural rules.49 The Court explained:
A defendant does not have a constitutional right to receive personal
instruction from the trial judge on courtroom procedure. Nor does the
Constitution require judges to take over chores for apro se defendant that
would normally be attended to by trained counsel as a matter of course.
Farretta recognized as much.°
The Court further illuminated its stance on procedural adherence in McNeil
v. United States." There the Court affirmed dismissal of a Federal Tort
Claims Act suit based on the pro se plaintiffs failure to exhaust administra-
tive remedies.52 The Court stated:
While we have insisted that the pleadings prepared by prisoners who do
not have access to counsel be liberally construed, and have held that some
procedural rules must give way because of the unique circumstance of
incarceration, we have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary
civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those
who proceed without counsel. As we have noted before, "in the long run,
experience teaches that strict adherence to the procedural requirements
specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded adminis-
tration of the law."
53
The Court, when faced with the question of whether or not a federal district
court judge should be required to inform pro se litigants of summary
judgment requirements, will likely apply the same philosophies evidenced
in McKaskle and McNeil, viewing the duty to do so as a "chore" that a
judge should not be required to "take over" for a pro se litigant.' Such a
concluded that because McKaskle had been able to make motions, argue points of
law, and question witnesses, outside counsel's assistance outside of the presence
of the jury as well as before the jury did not interfere with the defendant's right to
present his own defense. Id. at 183-84.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106 (1993).
521d. at 113.
53 Id. at 113 (citations omitted) (quotingMohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807,
826 (1980)).
54McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 184.
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result would further follow from the Court's view of the essential function
of summary judgment.55 The Court, in explaining that summary judgment
was a desirable way of disposing of pro se prisoner's claims not frivolous
on their face, but lacking a genuine issue of material fact,56 noted,
"summary judgment serves as the ultimate screen to weed out truly
insubstantial lawsuits prior to trial."57
The only generalized special treatment the Supreme Court has
guaranteed pro se litigants, apart from the due process rights accorded all
litigants in civil cases, is the right to have courts liberally construe their
pleadings." In Haines v. Kerner,59 a prisoner pro se litigant's complaint
against state and prison officials alleged that he was denied due process in
proceedings which led to his solitary confinement, during which he claimed
to have sustained physical injuries.' The Court reversed a dismissal under
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a
claim, noting that, as a general matter, pro se pleadings are held to less
stringent standards than those of represented litigants. 6' Further, the Court
held that a pro se plaintiff's pleadings should not be dismissed for failure
to state a claim unless "it appears 'beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove
no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.' ,
62
This liberalized view toward the pro se plaintiff's pleadings has been
followed closely both by the Supreme Court63 and lower federal courts' in
the years since the Haines decision.
55 See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600 (1998).
5& Id
57 Id.
58 Bradlow, supra note 3, at 671; see also Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10
(1980) (per curiam); Haines v. Kemer, 404 U.S. 519, 521 (1972) (per curiam).
59 Haines, 404 U.S. at 519.
60 id.
61 Id. at 520.
62 Id. at 520-21. In full, the Court stated:
[A]llegations such as those asserted by petitioner, however inartfuiy
pleaded, are sufficient to call for the opportunity to offer supporting
evidence. We cannot say with assurance that under the allegations of the
pro se complaint, which we hold to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers, it appears "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief."
Id. (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
63 See Hughes, 449 U.S. at 9-10.
64 See, e.g., Brandon v. Dist. of Columbia Bd. of Parole, 734 F.2d 56,62 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (if the complaint misapprehends the claim appropriafe to its grievance,
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While the Court's rule in Haines65 is limited to construction of
pleadings and does not on its face extend to further procedural leniency,
some federal circuit courts have stretched the Court's reasoning to support
holdings granting various procedural exceptions to pro se litigants.67 On the
other hand, many circuits have justified refusal to do so on the basis of the
Court's general refusal to grant procedural exceptions to pro se litigants.68
B. Federal Circuit Courts ofAppeals and Pro Se Litigants: Varying
Levels of Paternalism
A majority of circuit courts hold pro se litigants to the same standards
as represented litigants when procedural hurdles other than that of summary
judgment arise.69 In fact, some of the same federal courts of appeals that
require notice of summary judgment procedures be given pro se litigants
have denied leniency in cases involving amended complaints,70 compliance
the trial court must recharacterize the claim); Madison v. Tahash, 359 F.2d 60, 61
(8th Cir. 1966) (construing application for appointment of counsel as one for a
certificate of probable cause); DeWitt v. Pail, 366 F.2d 682, 685 (9th Cir. 1966)
(pro se complaints cannot be construed inflexibly so as to require dismissal if the
complaint fails to request appropriate relief); Downing v. New Mexico State
Supreme Court, 339 F.2d 435, 436 (10th Cir. 1964) (per curiam) (pleadings
prepared by layman should be construed liberally).
65Haines, 404 U.S. at 520-21.
6 Bradlow, supra note 3, at 672.
67 See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 69-79 and accompanying text.
69 See, e.g., Dozier v. Ford Motor Co., 702 F.2d 1189, 1194 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
("At least where a litigant is seeking a monetary award, we do not believepro se
status necessarily justifies special consideration... [HIfe cannot generally be
permitted to shift the burden of litigating his case to the courts ... ") (citation
omitted); Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) ("Merely
proceeding pro se does not confer an extension of the ordinary jurisdictional
requirement of timely filing."); United States v. Fowler, 605 F.2d 181, 183 (5th
Cir. 1979) (trial court's denial of a pro se litigant's request for a continuance to
obtain counsel not in error); United States v. Pinkey, 548 F.2d 305, 311 (10th Cir.
1977) (one "who proceeds pro se with full knowledge and understanding of the
risks" involved is not entitled to any greater rights than a represented litigant);
Larkin v. United Ass'n of Journeymen, 338 F.2d 335, 336 (1st Cir.1964) (per
curiam) (pro se litigant charged with knowing appellate rule requiring the filing of
an appellate brief as prerequisite to oral argument); Springer v. Best, 264 F.2d 24,
26 (9th Cir. 1959) ("It is not the function of this Court to supervise laymen in the
practice of law.").
70 See Ping Tou Bian v. Taylor, No. 01-7144, 2001 WL 1631254, at *2 (2d Cir.
Dec. 17, 2001) (holding that the court would not accept the amended complaint of
a pro se plaintiff who had amended his complaint without leave of court in
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with requirements for appellate briefs,7' and the amount in controversy
requirement.72 Other specific examples of courts refusing procedural
exceptions are found in the contexts of appearance for depositions,73
appeals periods,74 and pretrial statements.7
In refusing to grant pro se litigants procedural exceptions, several
courts have narrowly construed the Supreme Court's holding in Haines
granting pro se litigants the right to have their pleadings read liberally.76
For example, the Sixth Circuit, in Wells v. Brown,77 upheld dismissal for
failure to state a claim in a suit brought by a pro se prisoner against prison
and state officials.7' The court discussed one reason for a narrow applica-
tion of the rule:
[I]n recent years an increasingly large number of frivolous cases have
been filed in federal court-both by lawyers andpro se. Many of these
contravention of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)).
7 See Stephenson v. Township of Thornton, No. 00-3154,2001 WL 1071765,
at *1 (7th Cir. Sept. 7,2001) (holding that an appellate brief submitted byapro se
litigant is not sufficient to sustain an appeal unless it meets the basic requirements
outlined in Fed. R. App. P. 28(a). "[W]e cannot cure the substantial deficiencies
in Stephenson's brief by creating legal arguments for him.... [W]e may not review
this appeal because Stephenson has failed to comply with basic requirements
designed to promote our interest in the uniform administration ofjustice.") (citation
omitted).
72 See Dozier, 702 F.2d at 1194 (refusing to allow a pro se plaintiffto refile his
complaint to comply with the amount in controversy requirement to avoid res
judicata).
73 See, e.g., Hepperle v. Johnston, 590 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1979) (pro se plain-
tiff's repeated failure to appear for depositionjustified dismissal under Fed. R. Civ.
Pro. 41(b) after warning of possible dismissal).
74 See Martinez-McBean v. Virgin Islands, 562 F.2d 908 (3d Cir. 1977) (pro se
plaintiffwho understood appeal procedures not entitled to relief from earlier order
of dismissal).
75 See Burgs v. Sissel, 745 F.2d 526 (8th Cir. 1984) (pro se plaintiffs § 1983
complaint properly dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) for failure to amend a
flawed pretrial statement after three chances to comply with the district court's
pretrial order).
76 See, e.g., McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) ("Our duty to be
'less stringent' with pro se complaints does not require us to conjure up unpled
allegations."); Holsey v. Collins, 90 F.R.D. 122, 128 (D. Md. 1981) (even pro se
litigants must meet some minimum standards); Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237,
239 (D.D.C. 1978) (pro se plaintiffs should plead with "requisite specificity, so as
to give defendants notice" of constitutional allegations).
'n Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591(6th Cir. 1989).71 Id. at 594.
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suits waste the time of public officials, lawyers and the courts. Minimum
pleading requirements are needed, even for pro se plaintiffs, whose
lawsuits now comprise more than 1000 or almost 25% ofthe appeals filed
in this Court.... Before the recent onslaught ofpro se prisoner suits, the
Supreme Court suggested thatpro se complaints are to be held to a less
stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Neither that
Court nor other courts, however, have been willing to abrogate basic
pleading essentials in pro se suits?7
9
These decisions are contrary to those of other courts, which, reading
Haines broadly, have extended procedural leniency to pro se litigants when
addressing personal service requirements,"0 appearance at status calls,8 1 and
response to motions for dismissal.8 2
The federal courts of appeals decisions in the realm of pro se litigants
have been influenced, and in some instances dictated, by the Supreme
Court's decisions addressing the special issues that surround pro se litigants
in the federal courts. While the Supreme Court has never specifically
addressed the propriety of summary judgment instructions for pro se
litigants,8 3 the Court's decisions in this general area have established the
foundation and framework for the debate among the circuits as to whether
federal district court judges should be required to inform pro se litigants of
Rule 56 requirements for summary judgment.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT:
SHOULD SUMMARY JUDGMENT INSTRUCTIONS BE GIVEN
TO PRO SE LITIGANTS?
Fundamental differences as to what constitutes equal access to justice
drive the debate over whether federal district court judges should be
required to inform pro se litigants of their obligations when faced with a
9 Id. (citations omitted).
80 See Borzeka v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 444,446-47 (9th Cir. 1984) (Fed. R. Civ.
4(d)(5), requiring personal service on an officer or agent of the United States when
the United States is a party, should be given "flexible construction," particularly
in the case of a pro se litigant).
8'See Camps v. C & P Tel. Co., 692 F.2d 120, 124-25 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (pro se
plaintiff who arrived late for status call should not have his case dismissed).
82 See Mitchell v. Inman, 682 F.2d 886, 887-88 (11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam)
(pro se plaintiff who was not given notice of the need to respond to a motion to
dismiss should not have his case dismissed for failure to do so).
8 Bradlow, supra note 3, at 668.
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motion for summary judgment. While each court of appeals advances its
individualized bases in rulings on the question, as a general matter the
courts answering this question affirmatively focus on the pro se litigant's
disadvantaged status in the adversary system." On the other hand, courts
answering in the negative tend to focus on the advantage such a rule would
give pro se litigants over represented litigants."5
A. Pro Se Notification of Summary Judgment Requirements: A Circuit
Court ofAppeals Mandate
One of the first federal circuit court of appeals cases to hold pro se
litigants to less exacting summary judgment procedural requirements was
Phillips v. United States Board of Parole.6 The case involved a prisoner
pro se litigant whose complaint had been dismissed at the summary
judgment stage by a federal district court when the plaintiff failed to
respond to the motion with supporting affidavits.87 The D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the requirements of Rule 56 should not be applied
strictly to prisoner pro se litigants because of the difficulties of gathering
evidence while incarcerated.8" In later decisions, both in the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals and other circuits that followed its lead, this procedural
leniency toward pro se prisoners developed into a mandate that all pro se
litigants be informed of the requirements of the summary judgment rule in
a manner that could be understood by the litigants.8 9 The line of decisions
following Phillips is based on the reasoning that a pro se litigant who has
not been warned of his obligation to submit reply affidavits in response to
a motion for summary judgment has not been given an opportunity to
comply with Rule 56(e).90
4 See infra notes 86-96 and accompanying text.85See infra notes 105-14 and accompanying text.
86 Phillips v. United States Bd. of Parole, 352 F.2d 711 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (per
curiam).
17Id. at 712.
11 See id. at 713-14.
89 See Hudson v. Hardy, 412 F.2d 1091, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1968); accord Lewis
v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100, 102 (7th Cir. 1982); Davis v. Zahradnick, 600 F.2d 458,
460 (4th Cir. 1979); Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Cir. 1975) (per
curiam).
90 See Maggette v. Dalsheim, 709 F.2d 800, 802 (2d Cir. 1983); Moore v.
Florida, 703 F.2d 516, 520 (1 th Cir. 1983); Madyun v. Thompson, 657 F.2d 868,
877 (7th Cir. 1981); Ham v. Smith, 653 F.2d 628, 630 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per
curiam); Roseboro, 528 F.2d at 310.
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Other circuit courts of appeals affording pro se litigants procedural
leniency at the summary judgment stage by requiring district court trial
judges to inform the litigant of the requirements of summary judgment
derive the basis of their reasoning from a number of different sources.
Some courts draw from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,9' reasoning
that service of a motion for summary judgment does not adequately advise
a pro se litigant of the duty to submit affidavits or other evidentiary
materials in opposition to the motion because the requirement is not
explicitly stated in Rule 56(e).92 Other circuits extend the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Haines v. Kerner,93 holding that it would be illogical to
liberally construe a pro se litigant's pleadings only to thereafter strictly
enforce procedural compliance.9" Another line of reasoning justifies the
91 See Ross v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1216, 1219 (7th Cir. 1985) ("a gloss on the
federal rules"); Lewis, 689 F.2d at 101 ("fair inference from the rules"). This
reasoning, however, has been rejected by other courts. See Jacobsen v. Filler, 790
F.2d 1362, 1365-67 (9th Cir. 1986) (the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
themselves provide adequate notice); Dozier v. Ford Motor Co. 702, F.2d 1189,
1194 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (pro se status does not entitle litigants to special treatment);
Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) ("The right of self-
representation does not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of
procedural and substantive law."); United States v. Pinkey, 548 F.2d 305,311 (10th
Cir. 1977) (trial court has an obligation to be "advocate" for pro se litigant).
92 See Moore, 703 F.2d at 521 ("the instant local rule was not constructive
notice"); Lewis, 689 F.2d at 101-02 (obligation to submit reply affidavits not
obvious to layman); Ham, 653 F.2d at 630 ("fair notice" of Rule 56 requirements
is "bare minimum").
In Lewis, the pro se plaintiff was served a motion for summary judgment, yet
nowhere in the papers was there notice that failure to counter the defendant's
affidavits with his own would result in the defendant's affidavits being taken as
true. Lewis, 689 F.2d at 101. While admitting that notice of such a consequence is
outlined in the rules of procedure, the Seventh Circuit held that specific notice
should be given to pro se litigants. Id. In this case, the court noted that while the
plaintiff had a reasonable opportunity to respond to the motion: "reasonable
opportunity presupposes notice. Mere time is not enough, if knowledge of the
consequences of not making use of it is wanting." Id. at 102.
93Haines v. Kemer, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (per curiam).
94While the Supreme Court's decision in Haines is limited to construction of
pleadings, some circuit courts have extended that decision to require district court
judges to provide pro se litigants with notice ofsummaryjudgmentprocedures. The
Tenth Circuit, in Merila v. Johnson, 52 F.3d 338 (10th Cir. 1995) (unpublished
table decision), No. 94-4202, 1995 WL 225240, at *1, extended the Supreme
Court's ruling in Haines using three great leaps of logic:
"A pro se litigant's pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to a less
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guarantee of notice through a view that summary judgment is "contrary to
lay intuition.... ."95 When dealing with prisoner pro se plaintiffs, several
circuits justify requiring notification of summary judgment requirements
by looking to the unique circumstances of incarceration.96
stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." "District
courts must take care to insure thatpro se litigants are provided with proper
notice regarding the complex procedural issues involved in summary
judgment proceedings." Thus, "pro se litigants are to be given reasonable
opportunity to remedy the defects in their pleadings," including the
opportunity to resubmit affidavits to conform with Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
Id. (citations omitted). See also Muhammad v. Rowe, 638 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1981)
(per curiam), where the court stated:
[P]laintiff is "entitled to an opportunity to offer proof' unless "it appears
'beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief."' Here, plaintiff was not only
denied counsel, but also was not informed that he could answer documents
filed in support of the defendants' motion for summary judgment with his
own documents....
Id. at 695-96 (citations omitted); cf Shah v. Hutto, 704 F.2d 717 (allowing appeal
ofplaintiffpro se prisoners even though it was untimely filed and they did not file
a motion for extension of time to file), revd on other grounds, 722 F.2d 1167 (4th
Cir. 1983); Craig v. Garrison, 549 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1977) (holding that a pro se
prisoner should have been advised of his right to obtain an extension of time in
which to file his notice of appeal if he could have shown excusable neglect, and
that the trial court must make such inquiry), superseded by statute as stated in Shah
v. Hutto, 722 F.2d 1167 (4th Cir. 1983); McLaughlin, supra note 3, at 1120
(arguing that diminished filing requirements for pro se litigants are not enough to
ensure said litigants appropriate access to the courts).
9 Lewis, 689 F.2d at 102 (most pro se litigants think that all lawsuits proceed
directly from complaint to answer to trial, and do not know how to respond to the
motion); see also Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1368 (9th Cir. 1986)
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting). See generally Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 2.
96 See, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 492 (1973) ("[w]hat for a
private citizen would be a dispute with his landlord... becomes, for the prisoner,
a dispute with the State."); Jacobsen, 790 F.2d at 1364-65 n.4 (incarceration often
factually hampers a prisoner's ability to gather evidence to support a case against
his keeper); Wiggins v. Sargent, 753 F.2d 663,668 (8th Cir. 1985) (apro se litigant
may not be able to obtain counsel even if desired); Phillips v. United States Bd. of
Parole, 352 F.2d 711, 713-14 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (per curiam) (discussing the
handicaps related to securing advice of counsel and gathering evidence while
incarcerated); cf. Johnson v. RAC Corp., 491 F.2d 510, 514 (4th Cir. 1974)
(court's duty to inform non-moving party of right to file affidavits heightened
where non-moving party has superior access to facts); Dirk E. Eshleman, Note, Pro
Se Appeals in the Fifth Circuit: The Gradual Demise of the Notice Exception to
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Of the six circuits that require the district court trial judge to inform a
pro se litigant of the requirements of Rule 56, four circuits appear to require
automatic reversal if the pro se litigant in a civil suit is not given notice.
7
The Seventh Circuit allows for reversal only if the plaintiff can prove
prejudice resulting from the lack of notice. The Ninth Circuit has stated
that lack of notice is reversible error but that, in certain cases, a harmless
error analysis may come into play."
The reasoning and analysis of the courts that require judicial notifica-
tion of the requirements of the summary judgment rule is often directly
contradicted by that of those circuits refusing to mandate such notice.
B. Circuit Courts ofAppeals' Refisal to Require Summary Judgment
Instructions for Pro Se Litigants
The circuit courts of appeals that have denied pro se litigants the right
to be notified as to the requirements of the summary judgment rule'00 have,
Federal Rule ofAppellate Procedure 4(a) and an Argument for Its Resurrection,
4 REV. LrrIG. 71, 74 (1983) (confinement makes compliance with procedural
deadlines and obligations difficult because of the prisoner's limited ability to
contact the proper authorities concerning the progress of his lawsuit). But see
Jacobsen, 790 F.2d at 1367 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (distinguishing between the
poor and the imprisoned "creates two classes of indigent litigants, those who are
poor and law abiding, and those who are poor and not. It then affords lesser rights
and protections to the former.").
The scenario involving pro se prisoners is common, as ninety-five percent of
pro se litigation involves prisoners seeking a writ of habeas corpus or alleging civil
rights violations. Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 2, at 159-60.
97 See Champion v. Artuz, 76 F.3d 483, 486 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam); Neal
v. Kelly, 963 F.2d 453, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Griffith v. Wainwright, 772 F.2d
822, 826 (1 th Cir. 1985); Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309,310 (4th Cir. 1975)
(per curiam).
98 See, e.g., Sellers v. Henman, 41 F.3d 1100, 1102 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[W]e do
not reverse... unless there is reason to believe that the plaintiffwas prejudiced by
the failures .... ).
9 See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 961 (9th Cir. 1998). The court stated:
[T]here may be the unusual case where the harmlessness of the failure to
give the required notice may be established on the record .... For example,
judicial notice by the district court of its own records, either at the behest
of the defendant or sua sponte, may disclose that the plaintiff had recently
been served with Klingele notice [pro se prisoner entitled to notice of Rule
56 requirements] in prior litigation. Similarly, an objective examination of
the record may disclose that the pro se prisoner litigant has a complete
understanding of Rule 56's requirements gained from some other source.
10o See supra note 24.
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in a general manner, based their decisions on both a strict adherence to
views espoused by the Supreme Court in Faretta°' dicta and a narrow
reading of the Haines"°2 decision.'03
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, inBrockv. Hendershott,104 refused
to require such instructions out of a sense of fairness for other parties who
chose counsel and must bear the risk of their attorney's mistakes." 5 Some
' Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). See generally Bradlow, supra
note 3, at 659-71.02 Haines v. Kemer, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (per curiam).
103 Cf. Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir. 1997). While the First
Circuit has not written an opinion evidencing their view on whether pro se litigants
are to be given summary judgment instructions, they did, in Ahmed, evidence a
willingness to strictly construe the Supreme Court's rulings in Haines and Faretta.
See id. The court elaborated on the distinction between construing pleadings
liberally and granting leniency at the summary judgment stage. In this case the pro
se plaintiff did not contend that he should have been provided with summary
judgment instructions at the federal district court level, and the court ruled that
summary judgment had been appropriate:
We are required to construe liberally a pro se complaint and may affirm its
dismissal only ifa plaintiffcannot prove any set of facts entitling him or her
to relief. However, pro se status does not insulate a party from complying
with procedural and substantive law. The policy behind affording pro se
plaintiffs liberal interpretation is that if they present sufficient facts, the
court may intuit the correct cause of action, even if it was imperfectly pled.
This is distinct from the case at hand, in which the formal elements of the
claim were stated without the requisite supporting facts.
Id. (citations omitted).
104 Brock v. Hendershott, 840 F.2d 339 (6th Cir. 1988). In Brock, the Sixth
Circuit adopted an exception similar to that adopted by the Ninth Circuit in
Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1364 (9th Cir. 1986), in that only prisoner pro
se litigants were to be given help in complying with the rules of procedure. Brock,
840 F.2d at 343. In later cases, however, the Sixth Circuit extended the rule
requiring procedural compliance to include situations involving prisoner pro se
litigants. See Gaddis v. Myers, 178 F.3d 1294 (6th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table
decision), No. 97-6410, 1999 WL 196538, at *1 (holding prisoner pro se litigant
to standard pleadings requirements); Darroch v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corrs.,
No. 95-3560, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 2792, at *5 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1996) (requiring
prisoner pro se litigant to provide a transcript of the lower case on appeal in order
to argue that he had met his burden of proof).
'05 Brock, 840 F.2d at 342-43; see also Beck v. Skon, 253 F.3d 330, 333 (8th
Cir. 2001) (collecting a series of Eighth Circuit cases requiring pro se compliance
with procedural requirements. "Like any other civil litigant, Beck was required to
respond to defendants' motions with specific factual support for his claims to avoid
summary judgment.").
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courts have expressed concern that a mandate to provide notice would
encourage even greater numbers"° of frivolous pro se suits"°7 and impair
the impartiality of the trial judge." 8 Based partly on these rationales, the
Ninth Circuit, in Jacobsen v. Filler,'0° while still holding that summary
judgment instructions must be provided for prisoner pro se litigants,
declined to extend this rule to non-prisoner pro se litigants:
Besides favoring unrepresented litigants overbadly represented ones,
Jacobsen's suggestion would require the trial court to help one side to a
lawsuit rather than another solely because of the status of their legal
representation. Doing so necessarily implicates the court's impartiality
and discriminates against opposing parties who do have counsel. 1°
'0' See Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989) (large numbers of
frivolous pro se litigation places a heavy burden on the court system); Klein v.
Spear, Leeds & Kellogg, 309 F. Supp. 341,342 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (discussing one
pro se litigant who had filed more than thirty frivolous law suits).
1
07 See generally Wayne T. Westling & Patricia Rasmussen, Prisoners'Access
to the Courts: Legal Requirements and Practical Realities, 16 LoY. U. CHI. L.J.
273, 291 n.108, 304 (1985) (only 4.9% of prisoner civil rights cases, 80-95 of
which were pro se in 1979, survive the pretrial requirement of not being frivolous
or malicious); PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS COMMITTEE, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,
RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES FORHANDLiNGPRISONERCIVILRIGHTS CASES INTHE
FEDERAL COURTS 9 (1980). Cf Marie Higgins Williams, The Pro Se Criminal
Defendant, Standby Counsel, and the Judge: A Proposalfor Better-Defined Roles,
71 U. COLO. L. REv. 789 (2000):
The precise number of people who represent themselves is somewhat hard
to determine, because very few jurisdictions keep statistics regarding pro
se litigants. One jurisdiction that did keep track of its pro se litigants,
however, is Spokane County, Washington. In 1998, approximately 2500
people represented themselves in Spokane County, up from 2200 pro se
litigants in 1997. Those figures, however, include parties in both civil and
criminal trials, and the bulk of thepro se litigants are in the civil arena.
Id. at 815 (footnotes omitted).
10 8 See Bradlow, supra note 3, at 668 (Faretta and Wiggins were decided with
a view toward preserving the impartiality of the judge, which "was one of the
original justifications for the sixth amendment right to counsel.").
109 Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986).
10 Id. at 1365 n.7. While the court based this decision on the ground that
judicial assistance to pro se litigants in general undermines the adversary system,
the court reasoned that the damage done to the system was justifiable in the
prisoner context, explaining that prisoners often cannot get lawyers even if they
have the financial means to do so. Id. at 1364 n.4.
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In Jacobsen, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also partially relied on
their assessment that the requirements of Rule 56 were sufficiently clear. 1 '
The Fifth Circuit followed the Ninth Circuit's lead in Martin v. Harrison
County Jail,"' noting that Rule 56 provides a succinct statement of
litigants' obligations at the summary judgment stage." 3 The court stated,
"[t]o adopt any other rule would make it impossible to determine precisely
what notice was adequate in a given case."" 4
The holdings of both the Ninth and Fifth Circuits provide support for
the argument that Rule 56's requirements are sufficiently clear to provide
all litigants with notice of what is required at the summary judgment stage,
thereby sufficiently protecting the pro se litigant's right to equal access to
justice.
II. THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT RULE'S
GUIDELINES AND REQUIREMENTS
The summary judgment rule provides a fair and concise method with
which to ensure that already crowded court dockets are not filled with
unmeritorious, spurious suits." 5 The summary judgment rule, set forth in
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, is clear in its terms and provides
procedural safeguards for all litigants, thereby negating the need for a
distortion of the rules by requiring judges to provide pro se litigants with
specific summary judgment instructions." 6
.' Id. at 1366.
2 Martin v. Harrison County Jail, 975 F.2d 192 (5th Cir. 1992) (per curiam).
I"Id. at 193.
114 Id.
"5 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819-20 n.35 (1982).
" 6 See infra notes 117, 145 and accompanying text Furthermore, the summary
judgment rule is not the greatest culprit in pro se litigants' lack of success on the
federal trial court level. It is instead the nature of pro se litigants' economic
situation that most hinders their success in court. See Jacobsen, 790 F.2d at 1167-
68 (Reinhardt, J. dissenting) (pro se status is a matter of necessity rather than
choice); McLaughlin, supra note 3, at 1132 ("few individuals able to afford
assistance of counsel choose to proceed pro se. It is not surprising, then, that most
pro se litigants represent themselves because of an economic inability to procure
counsel.") (footnote omitted); cf. Hudson v. Hardy, 412 F.2d 1091, 1094-95 (D.C.
Cir. 1968) (even when aware of the responding affidavit requirement, the pro se
litigant could become exasperated easily at his inability to gather facts supporting
the affidavit and fail to respond). Merely informing a pro se litigant of his
obligations under Rule 56(e), therefore, may not safeguard his claim sufficiently.
This economic disadvantage is a hurdle best cleared utilizing public funding and
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other non-procedural reforms that do not bend the well-established and effective
rules of procedure.
The very fact that pro se litigants are, in most instances, at an economic
disadvantage, "hampers the pro se litigant's ability to comply with the affidavit
requirement under Rule 56(e). Testimony crucial to presenting an issue of material
fact often is unobtainable because the pro se litigant cannot afford to pay for a
deposition before trial." See McLaughlin supra note 3, at 1132 n. 149. In addition,
being at an economic disadvantage can be prohibitive to the success of a pro se
litigant throughout the discovery phase, in that expenses of discovery are the
primary costs of litigation after attorney's fees. See Zeigler & Hermann supra note
2, at 192.
Further, the federal in forma pauperis statute does not provide discovery costs
for pro se litigants. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). This statute was
intended to benefit indigent litigants and to provide them with meaningful access
or equality of participation. The statute provides, among other things, that a party
who proceeds under the statute may do so "without prepayment of fees and costs
or security therefor .... "Id. § 1915(a). In 1996, the Prison Litigation Reform Act
amended the statute, requiring a prisoner bringing a civil action or appealing in
forma pauperis to pay the full amount of a filing fee. Id. § 1915(b)(1). This
amendment was designed to deter frivolous prisoner litigation in courts by making
all prisoners seeking to bring lawsuits or appeals feel the deterrent effect created
by liability for filing fees. See In re Smith, 114 F.3d 1247, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1997);
Jackson v. Stinnett, 102 F.3d 132, 133-34 (5th Cir. 1996); In reNagy, 89 F.3d 115,
118 (2d Cir. 1996); Rivera v. DisAbato, 962 F. Supp. 38,40 (D.N.J. 1997). For a
collection of Supreme Court cases analyzing this statute, see David B. Sweet,
Annotation, Supreme Court's Construction and Application of 28 USCS § 1915,
Providing for Federal Court Proceedings in Forma Pauperis, 121 L. Ed. 2d 817
(1999). See also Robert S. Catz & Thad M. Guyer, Federal in Forma Pauperis
Litigation: In Search ofJudicial Standards, 31 RuTGERS L. REv. 655 (1979).
Once a person has obtained leave to proceed in forma pauperis, they may apply
to the court for appointment of an attorney. Appointment of counsel in these cases
is at the judge's discretion. Generally, however, it will only occur in "exceptional
circumstances." Miller v. Simmons, 814 F.2d 962,966 (4th Cir. 1987); Wilborn v.
Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d
1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 1980). Some circuits have adopted less demanding tests. See,
e.g., Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58, 60-61 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting factors
that point in favor of appointing counsel such as: likelihood of success on the
merits, need for detailed investigation, presence of important credibility issues, pro
se litigant's ability, and complex legal issues); Macin v. Freake, 650 F.2d 885,
887-88 (7th Cir. 1981) (noting factors that lend towards appointment of counsel).
The definition of "costs" and "fees" is not supplied in 28 U.S.C. § 1915,
lending support for the view that expenses of discovery are not within contempla-
tion of the statute. Therefore, courts can and do deny payment of such on the basis
that there is no statutory authority for prepayment of expenses such as those
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A. Summary Judgment's Requirements Are Clear and Not Unduly
Burdensome to a Pro Se Plaintiff
While scholars and several courts have been quick to assume that the
requirements of Rule 56 are complex and difficult for a pro se litigant to
understand," 7 the Rule is not, in and of itself, intricate or confounding."'
Courts have recognized this fact in holding that the requirements listed in
the text of the Rule itself provide sufficient notice to pro se litigants of their
obligations when faced with a motion for summary judgment." 9
Rule 56 is divided into seven components.' 0 Rules 56(a) and (b)
provide the guidelines for when and how a summary judgment motion may
be submitted to the court.' Rule 56(c) states that the motion requesting
summary judgment must be served on an opposing party "at least 10 days
before the time fixed for the hearing."'" In addition, Rule 56(c) mandates
associated with taking a deposition. See Beard v. Stephens, 372 F.2d 685, 690 (5th
Cir. 1967) (holding, without reference to fees or costs under § 1915, that leave to
proceed in forma pauperis did "not carry with it any such affirmative assistance
from the court in the conduct of this civil case"); Toliver v. Cmty. Action Comm'n
to Help the Econ., Inc., 613 F. Supp. 1070, 1072 (S.D.N.Y.) ("no clear statutory
authority for the prepayment of discovery costs" such as the expense of taking a
deposition), aff'd without opp., 800 F.2d 1128 (2d Cir. 1985); Ebenhart v. Power,
309 F. Supp. 660, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (expressing "doubt[ ] ... as to whether
Section 1915 authorize[d] [the] Court to order the appropriation of Government
funds in civil suits to aid private litigants in conducting pre-trial discovery"); see
also United States v. Wilson, 690 F.2d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir. 1982) (the right to
appear pro se does not include the right to research claims at the state's expense).
Thus it is not surprising that only 6.5% of pro se litigants attempt to obtain
discovery. Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 2, at 204.
"' See Jacobsen, 790 F.2d at 1368 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting); Lewis v.
Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100, 102 (7th Cir. 1982); Madyun v. Thompson, 657 F.2d 868,
877 (7th Cir. 1981); McLaughlin, supra note 3, at 1110.
118 For a more in depth analysis of Rule 56, as well as collections of cases
analyzing the rule, see generally Martin B. Louis, Federal Summary Judgment
Doctrine: A CriticalAnalysis, 83 YALE L.J. 745 (1974); William P. McLauchlan,
An Empirical Study of the Federal Summary Judgment Rule, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 427
(1977); John W. Stamper, Rule 56: Using Summary Judgment Motions, 7 LrIG.
36 (1981).
"9 See Martin v. Harrison County Jail, 975 F.2d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1992) (per
curiam); Jacobsen, 709 F.2d at 1366.
120 FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
121 Id. 56(a)-(b).
'22 Id. 56(c).
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that the motion be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."" 3 The party
moving for summary judgment has the burden of establishing the absence
of an issue of material fact 24 and must provide adequate notice of the
motion to the opponent. 25 Rule 56(d) states that a court may either dismiss
the entire case or part thereof on a motion for summary judgment and lists
the procedure for an order directing further proceedings for those dismissed
only in part.2 6 Rule 56(e) is most important for a party opposing the motion
for summary judgment in that it describes the party's obligations in
answering the motion. 27 Rule 56(e) is titled "Form of Affidavits; Further
Testimony; Defense Required."' 2 This simple language, on its face, is
enough to initially inform even a layperson of her obligation to defend the
motion. Rule 56(e) further provides that when a motion for summary
judgment is supported by affidavits and other evidentiary materials, the
opponent "must" respond with affidavits in opposition or evidentiary
materials of his or her own:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided
in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response,
by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party
does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered
against the adverse party.
29
The body of Rule 56(e) completely lists the obligations of a party who is
opposing a motion for summary judgment. In no uncertain terms, the Rule
'3 Id.; see also Jensen v. Klecker, 648 F.2d 1179, 1182 (8th Cir. 1981);
Cubbage v. Averett, 626 F.2d 1307, 1308 (5th Cir. 1980); Keiser v. Coliseum
Properties, Inc., 614 F.2d 406,410 (5th Cir. 1980); Jones v. Halekulani Hotel, Inc.,
557 F.2d 1308, 1310 (9th Cir. 1977); Reiver v. Murdoch & Walsh, P.A., 625 F.
Supp. 998, 1003 (D. Del. 1985).
124 See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 20, § 9.3, at 440.
125 FED. RL CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
126 Id. 56(d).
127 Id. 56(e).
128 Id.
129 Id.; see also FirstNat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253,289
(1968).
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lists what must be done to avoid the motion, specifically stating that
evidentiary materials are required, and furthermore lists the exact conse-
quences of failing to respond in the prescribed ways.
Under Rule 56(f) a trial judge is given discretion to refuse the motion,
grant a continuance, or "make such other order as is just" when faced with
a litigant who cannot respond with affidavits containing "facts essential to
justify the party's opposition."'30 Rule 56(g) provides that ajudge may hold
a party requesting a motion for summary judgment in contempt and may
order the payment of costs to the opposing party should it be determined
that affidavits have been made "in bad faith or solely for the purpose of
delay.' 3' Therefore, Rules 56(f) and 56(g) provide procedural safeguards
for pro se litigants, preventing the use of a motion for summary judgment
made with the sole intention of harassment'3 2 and granting a degree of
leniency to those who may not be able to provide affidavits or other
evidentiary materials at the summary judgment stage.13 In fact, many cases
130 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f).
131 Id. 56(g).
132 Id.
133 Although not exclusively in contexts involving pro se litigants, Rule 56(f)
has been used by several courts to provide time for a party opposing summary
judgment to obtain opposing affidavits when the court feels the party has not had
an adequate opportunity to do so. Several courts have held that when a party has
not had sufficient time to gather contradicting affidavits, it is a sufficient reason to
deny the motion for summary judgment until such can be done. See, e.g., SEC v.
Spence & Green Chem. Co., 612 F.2d 896, 901 (5th Cir. 1980) (summaryjudgment
decisions rest within the discretion of the trial court); Schaffer v. Kissinger, 505
F.2d 389, 390-91 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (granting the plaintiff an
opportunity to conduct discovery before maldng a decision on summaryjudgment);
Ward v. United States, 471 F.2d 667, 670-71 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding that plaintiffs
should have been given a continuance on a summary judgment motion and allowed
to conduct discovery which may have uncovered evidence to support their claims);
Slagle v. United States, 228 F.2d 673, 678-79 (5th Cir. 1956) (finding that there is
a difference between discovering whether there is an issue of fact and deciding that
issue and that summary judgment is inappropriate until an opportunity for such
discovery has been given); OKC Corp. v. Williams, 461 F. Supp. 540, 545-46
(N.D. Tex. 1978) (refusing to grant summary judgment until the parties had an
opportunity to conduct discovery); Goldboss v. Reimann, 44 F. Supp. 756,759-60
(S.D.N.Y. 1942) (courts may set aside a summaryjudgment motion until the parties
have an opportunity to support their claims through evidence obtained during
discovery).
Some courts, however, have refused to deny a motion for summary judgment
in spite of the fact that the opposing party claims they have not had enough time to
collect evidential materials to oppose the motion. But cf King v. Nat'l Indus., Inc.,
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reflect the propensity of trial judges to take a plaintiff's pro se status into
consideration when affording remedies under Rule 56(f). 1 34 The discretion
afforded a trial judge in applying the protections of Rule 56(f) and 56(g) is
essential to an equitable application of the rules and equitable treatment for
litigants, pro se and non-pro se alike, during the summary judgment
phase.
31
512 F.2d 29, 34 (6th Cir. 1975) (court determined that a year was more than
enough time for a plaintiff to conduct discovery and that a decision on a motion for
summary judgment was not premature); Robin Constr. Co. v. United States, 345
F.2d 610, 613-14 (3d Cir. 1965) (uncertainty of facts by itself will not forestall a
decision on summary judgment, there must be a good reason for granting a
continuance before a court will be compelled to do so).
114 One author notes:
While not a formal "reason" stated for inability to present facts essential
tojustify opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the significance of
a pro se appearance in opposition by a layman has not been overlooked by
the courts, not only in connection with forgiveness of the procedural
requirement of an affidavit under Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, but in connection with the sufficiency of the reasons shown for
inability to present such facts.
Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Sufficiency of Showing, Under Rule 569 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of Inability to Present by Affidavit Facts
Justifying Opposition to Motionfor Summary Judgment, 47 A.L.R. FED. 206, 243-
44 (1980 & Supp. 2001); see also Harris v. Pate, 440 F.2d 315, 318 (7th Cir. 1971)
(finding that district court erred in not granting a prisoner pro se plaintiff extra
time, pursuant to Rule 56(f), to gather evidentiary materials needed to withstand a
motion for summary judgment requested by defendant jailer. The court stated that
because the plaintiffwas not represented by counsel and, because of his incarcera-
tion, he was less able than ordinary parties to gather evidence quickly and that
denial of his request for additional time to do so effectively denied him a
reasonable opportunity to present all materials made pertinent to such a motion by
Rule 56.); Ahmad v. Burke, 436 F. Supp. 1307, 1313-14 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (pro se
plaintiff filed an inadequate affidavit in response to a motion for summary
judgment and the court, recognizing his pro se status, granted him an extension of
sixty days to engage in discovery and deferred the decision of the motion until
then). But see Nickens v. White, 622 F.2d 967, 970-71 (8th Cir. 1980) (pro se
prisoner's affidavit that he could not gather the needed information to oppose a
motion for summary judgment due to his incarcerated status inadequate to support
denial of the motion).
135 One author concludes:
The courts often cite the Rule [56(f)] to grant more time but make no
mention of affidavits having been filed or of their sufficiency, or assert the
remedies of Rule 56(f) ontheir own motion. Although aproper showing has
not been made under Rule 56(f), it permits a court to order a continuance
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Federal District Judge Kleinfeld wasjoined by four others in a vigorous
dissent to the Ninth Circuit's holding in Rand v. Rowland, 36 in which the
majority opinion had verified the circuit's requirement that a form
explainingRule 56 be provided to prisoner pro se litigants." 7 In his dissent,
Kleinfeld rebukes the court for following a rule that requires the delivery
of a boilerplate form listing the requirements of Rule 56 when the mandates
of the Rule itself are clear on their face. 3' He criticizes:
There is already a clear explanation of summary judgment procedures in
plain English. It is the text of Rule 56.... Our new form... does not tell
prisoners about partial summary judgments, as does Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56(c). It fails to warn prisoners that affidavits must be "made
on personal knowledge," and that they must state "facts such as would be
admissible in evidence".., as Rule 56(e) does.139
Later in his dissent, Kleinfeld points out that there is no reason to
assume that a pro se litigant who does not understand the requirements of
Rule 56 will understand a form listing those requirements and that
following such a procedure will not make the process any fairer.'
Fairness, he posits, is most frequently achieved by leaving trial court judges
to examine the issues on a case-by-case basis: "Individualized processes
have practical utility in identifying and fairly adjudicating prisoners'
or to make such other order as is just, and where it would be unjust to grant
summary judgment without allowing the opposing party an opportunity to
present his opposing evidence, the courts waive technicalities.
Rydstrom, supra note 134, at 210-11 (footnotes omitted); see also Fimex Corp. v.
Barmatic Prods. Co., 429 F. Supp. 978, 981 (E.D.N.Y.) (court, on its own motion,
ordering depositions of witnesses before granting defendant's motion for summary
judgment in order to fully develop the facts under 56(f)), aff'd by 573 F.2d 1289
(2d Cir. 1977); Warner-Lambert Pharm. Co. v. Sylk, 320 F. Supp. 1074, 1076
(E.D. Pa. 1970) (court, on its own motion, ordering further discovery before a
motion for summaryjudgment would be entertained, in order to more fully disclose
the legal issues and defenses involved); Dale Hilton, Inc. v. Triangle Publ'ns, Inc.,
27 F.R.D. 468, 475-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (court calling a conference of counsel
because of plaintiff's noncompliance with Rule 56(f) to determine if it should grant
time for discovery to be conducted by plaintiff.).
136 Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 964-72 (9th Cir. 1998) (Kleinfeld, J.,
dissenting).
137 Id. at 958.
138 Id. at 968 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
139 Id. at 967-68 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
'Id. at 968 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
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complaints.... Today's decision may discourage useful district court
initiatives to promote fairness, because... some districtjudges may think
it too dangerous to experiment."'4 Individualized processes such as those
espoused by Judge Kleinfeld are provided for in the summary judgment
context in the body of Rules 56(f) 42 and 56(g) 43 and will sufficiently
protect the interests of the pro se litigant.
The requirements of Rule 56 are succinctly embodied in the text of the
rule.1" In clear language, Rule 56(e) states that a party opposing summary
judgment "must" respond with contradicting affidavits or risk the conse-
quence of dismissal pursuant to the entry of an order granting summary
judgment. 4 s In addition, the Rule itself has procedural protections which,
at the discretion of the trial judge, can be used to aid pro se litigants
presenting meritorious claims. An attempt to alleviate perceived obstacles
faced by pro se litigants through a distortion of the Rules of Procedure does
not help the pro se litigant but instead oversteps the bounds of circuit court
authority and does injustice to the adversarial system and traditional role
of the trial judge.
IV. REQUIREMENT OF JUDICIAL NOTIFICATION OF
SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROCEDURES IS OUT OF LINE WITH
THE RULE-MAKING AUTHORITY OF CIRCUIT COURTS AND
THE NATURE OF THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM
A rule established by federal circuit courts of appeals that requires
district court judges to provide notice of the procedures of the summary
judgment rule to pro se litigants oversteps the authority of circuit courts to
make rules. Congress gave the power to promulgate rules of procedure for
the federal district courts expressly to those courts themselves and to the
Supreme Court.1" Circuit courts also exceed their authority in creating a
judicially mandated notification requirement because such a requirement,
in effect, is an addition to the summary judgment rule itself. Such an
141 Id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
14 2 FED. R. CIv. P. 56(f).
,43 Id. 56(g).
'44 Id. 56. The Rules of Civil Procedure may even be more accessible to
prisoner pro se litigants than non-prisoner pro se litigants. The Supreme Court, in
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977), held that at a minimum prisoners had to be
provided with access to a law library to comport with the requirements of due
process. See id. at 825-28.
14S FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
1428 U.S.C. § 2071 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
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addition, if needed, can only properly be achieved through a formal
amendment to Rule 56. Furthermore, requiring district court trial judges to
provide specialized summary judgment instructions to a particular segment
of litigants impermissibly skews the trial judges' traditional and crucial
impartial role in the American adversarial system.
A. Congress's Delineation ofRule-making Authority With Respect to
District Courts: No Room For Circuit Court Interference
Congress, through various statutes, has developed a scheme for
allocating rulemaking authority among the courts. Nowhere in this scheme
is there room for circuit court interference with the ability of district courts
to promulgate their own rules of procedure in accordance with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the United States Code.
Congress clearly gives the Supreme Court the power to create rules of
practice and procedure for cases in the federal district courts.'47 In addition,
147 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1994). The statute provides:
§ 2071. Rule-making power generally
(a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress
may from time to time prescribe rules for the conduct of their business.
Such rules shall be consistent with Acts of Congress and rules of practice
and procedure prescribed under section 2072 of this title.
(b) Any rule prescribed by a court, other than the Supreme Court, under
subsection (a) shall be prescribed only after giving appropriate public notice
and an opportunity for comment. Such rule shall take effect upon the date
specified by the prescribing court and shall have such effect on pending
proceedings as the prescribing court may order.
(c)(1) A rule of a district court prescribed under subsection (a) shall
remain in effect unless modified or abrogated by the judicial council of the
relevant circuit.
(2) Any other rule prescribed by a court other than the Supreme Court
under subsection (a) shall remain in effect unless modified or abrogated
by the Judicial Conference.
(d) Copies of rules prescribed under subsection (a) by a district court
shall be furnished to the judicial council, and copies of all rules prescribed
by a court other than the Supreme Court under subsection (a) shall be
furnished to the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts and made available to the public.
(e) If the prescribing court determines that there is an immediate need
for a rule, such court may proceed under this section without public notice
and opportunity for comment, but such court shall promptly thereafter
afford such notice and opportunity for comment.
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under 28 U.S.C. § 2071, "[t]he Supreme Court and all courts established by
Act of Congress may from time to time prescribe rules for the conduct of
their business."'48 This rulemaking authority is limited, however, in that
rules cannot enlarge or restrict jurisdiction or abrogate substantive law.'49
The federal district courts also find authority to establish their own rules of
practice and procedure pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.'
The rule states in pertinent part, "[e]ach district court, acting by a majority
of its district judges, may, after giving appropriate public notice and an
opportunity for comment, make and amend rules governing its practice."'
The above statutes, taken together, show that Congress intended that
the Supreme Court and the district courts themselves be given the authority
to promulgate rules of procedure for district court trials and that the courts
of appeals likewise have the power to develop rules to govern their various
procedures, as long as such rules are in compliance with the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and with the United States Code.' The word "their" in
the text of § 2071 means that the federal district and circuit courts of
appeals may establish rules to govern their own business and presupposes
no authority on behalf of circuit courts to mandate such rules for any other
courts.' The Supreme Court, in Crawford-El v. Britton,"' struck down a
(f) No rule may be prescribed by a district court other than under this
section.
Id.
141 Id. § 2071(a).
,49 See Concord Cas. & Sur. Co. v. United States, 69 F.2d 78, 80 (2d Cir. 1934);
Clymer v. United States, 38 F.2d 581, 582 (10th Cir. 1930).
IS' FED. R. CIV. P. 83.
,51 Id. 83(a)(1).
,52 See 28 U.S.C. § 2071; FED. R. Civ. P. 83; Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952,
965 (9th Cir. 1998) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) ("Congress gave the authority to
make procedural rules for the district courts to the Supreme Court and the district
courts, not to the courts of appeal."); Rodgers v. U.S. Steel Corp., 508 F.2d 152,
163 (3d Cir. 1975) ("The only statutory sources of district court rule maldng power
are Rule 83, Fed. R. Civ. P. and 28 U.S.C.§ 2071. These statutes, which probably
must be read inpari materia are broad enough to permit district court rule making
with respect to the conduct of attorneys in their practice before the court...
[section] 2071 permits rules 'consistent with Acts of Congress and rules of practice
and procedure prescribed by the Supreme Court.'") (citations omitted). See also
United States v. Hvass, 355 U.S. 570, 574-76 (1958); The Philadelphian, 60 F.
423, 427 (1st Cir. 1894) (courts of appeals have no power to prescribe rules for
district court).
153 Rand, 154 F.3d at 965 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
,-4 Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998).
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circuit court rule that, as they perceived, impeded the important discretion-
ary role of the trial judge at the summary judgment stage by establishing a
uniform rule involving standards of proof. '55 The Court noted:
It is the district judges rather than appellate judges like ourselves who
havce had the most experience in managing cases.... Given the wide
variety of civil rights and "constitutional tort" claims that trial judges
confront, broad discretion in the management of the factfinding process
may be more useful and equitable to all the parties than the categorical
rule imposed by the Court of Appeals.1
56
The guidelines as to who may create rules of procedure for the federal
courts reflect Congress's consideration of several factors and evidence no
support for the circuit courts' imposition upon the district court trial judges
of a requirement of judicial notification of summary judgment procedures
to pro se litigants. 7 The Ninth Circuit, in Rand v. Rowland,5 ' imposed
such a rule upon district court trial judges, making it reversible error for
failing to provide notification of summaryjudgment requirements to pro se
litigants.'59 In his dissent in Rand, Judge Kleinfeld discussed the above
statutory provisions allocating the authority to create rules of procedure
among the various courts:
Under this unambiguous scheme, the general rules are uniform nationally,
made after consideration of views from many sources. Congress takes
advantage of local knowledge by enabling courts to make rules not
inconsistent with the national scheme for governance of their own affairs,
about which their judges have direct knowledge. Circuit judges are in
between those who have direct local knowledge and those who can make
uniform national rules; we do not have much to contribute.
60
While circuit courts do have certain "supervisory powers" over the courts
in their district,'6' these supervisory powers do not allow circuit courts to
155 Id. at 594-97.
'561d. at 600-01.
'5' Rand, 154 F.3d at 965 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
' 8Id. at 952.
I59 d. at 961.
'6 oId. at 965 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
161 The Ninth Circuit, in Rand, relied partially on their "supervisory powers" to
justify a rule requiring notice of summary judgment procedure for pro se prisoner
litigants. See id. at 959; see also La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249,259-
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disregard established Rules of Civil Procedure.162 In adopting a rule that
requires district courtjudges to give additional notice of summary judgment
requirements, circuit courts do just that.
B. Requirement of Judicial Notification of Summary Judgment
Procedures is an Impermissible Addition by the Courts to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
The circuit court of appeals-created requirement that district court
judges provide particularized instructions of summary judgment require-
ments effectively operates as an amendment to the existing Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56163 The Rule itself provides for notice to all parties of
60 (1957) (supervisory power of circuit courts over district courts in their
jurisdiction proper when "necessary to properjudicial administration in the federal
system."); Burton v. United States, 483 F.2d 1182, 1187 (9th Cir. 1973) (finding
that it was the court's duty under its supervisory power to ensure strict compliance
with FED. R CRim. P. 11).
62 See United States v. Widgery, 778 F.2d 325, 328-29 (7th Cir. 1985). In
Widgery, the court explains the meaning ofsupervisorypower: "Supervisorypower
sometimes means the authority to announce new rules that promote the administra-
tion ofjustice, even though neither constitution nor statute requires such rules."Id.
at 328. However, the court in refusing to reverse a judgment without showing of
harmful error, noted that the supervisory power could not be used in contravention
of existing rules. "The supervisory power is part of the common law, and no court
has a common law power to disregard a rule or statute that was within the authority
of Congress to enact." Id. at 329. Circuit courts may use supervisory powers to "fill
in interstices," id., but may not, in using its supervisory powers, "'disregard the
considered limitations of the law it is charged with enforcing.' "Id. (quoting United
States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 737 (1980)). See also Rand, 154 F.3d at 966
(Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) ("Ve do not have 'supervisory power' over district
courts so broad that we can exercise authority that Congress expressly gave only
to other institutions.").
163 The Ninth Circuit, in Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986),
justified their refusal to expand pro se rights under the summary judgment rule by
stating that even if such an extension were deemed necessary, it would be outside
the authority of the court to amend the Rules of Procedure:
Finally, even if a substantive notice requirement were desirable, it
should be enacted through formal amendment rather than piecemeal
adjudication. Rule 56's separate notice provision (compare Rule 56(c) with
Rule 6(d)) and description of summaryjudgment (compare Rule 56(e) with
Rule 12(b)) indicate that the Supreme Court and its Advisory Committee
have considered the special problems raised by the summary judgment
procedure and, by failing to require specific notice of the nature of summary
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the summary judgment motion" and further provides various procedural
safeguards,' to be applied at the trial judge's discretion, that ensure
fairness to all litigants.' Therefore, requiring particularized notice to be
given to a specified segment of litigants is clearly outside the scope of the
Rule and thus is an impermissible exercise of circuit courts of appeals'
rulemaking/supervisory powers.
One scholar notes: "The ideal of nationally uniform procedural rules
promulgated by the Supreme Court after consideration by expert
committees--commonly known as 'court rulemaking'-has been the
cornerstone of civil rulemaking in the federal courts since adoption of the
Rules Enabling Act in 1934."'167 The "cornerstone" of judicial rulemaking
judgment, have concluded that the present federal rules... already apprise
litigants of their sumnaryjudgment obligations. Requiring additional notice
topro se litigants would be an accretion onto Rule 56(c), not an interpreta-
tion of it; and as an ad hoc amendment it would not be standardized,
codified, or subject to collective decision making.
Id. at 1366 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
'64FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Turner v. Johnson, 106 F.3d 1178, 1185 (5th
Cir. 1997) ("'The purpose of the notice provision in Rule 56(c) is to give the
nonmoving party a reasonable opportunity to submit opposing material to create a
genuine issue of material fact.' ") (quotingDillard v. Blackburn, 780 F.2d 509, 515
(5th Cir. 1986)); Kibort v. Hampton, 538 F.2d 90, 91 (5th Cir. 1976) (failure to
provide either notice or hearing to plaintiff before granting summary judgment to
defendant improperly cuts offplaintiff's opportunity to develop a record (through
submission of additional materials or request of an extension of time to develop
such materials though discovery) on which court may fairly rule on the merits of
his complaint).
165 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(f)-(g); see Pine Ridge Coal Co. v. Local 8377, United Mine
Workers of Am., 187 F.3d 415,421-22 (4th Cir. 1999) (motion may be made at any
time for summary judgment, but in the event that extra time is needed to secure
evidentiary material through discovery Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) provides for allowance
of time to secure these materials); Groover v. Magnavox Co., 71 F.R.D. 638, 639-41
(W.D. Pa. 1976); see also In re Gioioso, 979 F.2d 956,960 (3d Cir. 1992) (given the
wrongful character of the debtor's affidavits in opposition to summaryjudgment in
that they flatly contradicted earlier sworn depositions and failed to raise material
issues offact, Rule 56(g) required bankruptcycourtto order debtors to payreasonable
expenses and fees. Once the court has found bad faith, it must assess costs and fees);
Clark v. Hancock, 45 F.R.D. 512,514-15 (S.D. Ga. 1968) (awarding costs associated
with travel, lodging, board, witness fees and attorney's fees to party opposing motion
for summary judgment that had been made in bad faith).
'6See supra note 165.
167 See Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking,
Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L. J. 887, 888 (1999).
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is indeed the Supreme Court's authority under 28 U.S.C. § 2072168 "to
prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for
cases in the United States district courts... and courts of appeals." '169 This
power to create uniform national rules of procedure is vested exclusively
in the Supreme Court, making attempts by circuit courts to extend and alter
the purpose and meaning of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56
impermissible.17 I The Supreme Court has struck down various attempts of
circuit courts to extend the meaning of rules of procedure in contexts other
than that of summary judgment."' In Crawford-El v. Britton,72 the
Supreme Court addressed a rule created by the D.C. Circuit requiring a
plaintiff to meet a higher burden of proof than is normally required in suits
involving public officials. 73 Crawford-El involved a pro se prisoner
plaintiff alleging several violations of his constitutional rights by a
corrections officer. The district court, reasoning that it needed to protect
public servants from the burdens of trial and discovery that may impair the
performance of their duties, established a rule requiring the plaintiff to
16828 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994). The Act provides in full:
§ 2072. Rules of procedure and evidence; power to prescribe
(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules
of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United
States district courts (including proceedings before magistrates thereof) and
courts of appeals.
(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.
All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect
after such rules have taken effect.
(c) Such rules may define when a ruling of a district court is final for the
purposes of appeal under section 1291 of this title.
Id. 69 Id. § 2072(a).
170 See cf. Woodbury v. Andrew Jergens Co., 61 F.2d 736, 738 (2d Cir. 1925)
(holding that in exercising rulemaking power, a district court could not restrict or
enlarge rules made under predecessor to 28 U.S.C. § 2072).
'7 1 See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 547 (1998); Woodbury, 61 F.2d at 736.
In addition, at least one circuit court has recognized that its powers are limited to
construing the Rules of Procedure, precluding alteration or extension. See Wetzel
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1975). The court refused to require
notice prior to a determination of liability of all the members in a class action. Id.
at 256-57. It stated, "[w]e will not presume to exercise supervisory powers... to
mandate notice which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, promulgated by the
Supreme Court under authority from Congress, 28 U.S.C. § 2072, specifically do
not require." Id. at 254.
172 Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 574.
T3 Id. at 580.
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show clear and convincing evidence of improper motive on the part of the
corrections officer in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment. 74
Chief Judge Edwards concurred when the case was heard en banc by the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals: "These opinions offer judgments that are in
complete defiance of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure .... The net
result is judicial activism at its most extreme.... I believe that this court
has no authority to amend the Federal Rules.... " 75 The Supreme Court,
citing to Chief Judge Edward's concurrence, 76 struck down the heightened
standard, listing the various rules of procedure already in existence that
would provide adequate protection from suit for public officers, finding
that a heightened burden of proof would effectively and impermissibly strip
the trial court judge's discretion under the Rules of Procedure in applying
these well-established remedies.
The importance of the Rules of Procedure--a body of law to be
amended through designated statutory procedures-to the stability of the
judicial system was highlighted by the Supreme Court in Miner v. Atlass.17
In Miner, the Court affirmed an appellate decision that struck down an
exercise of local rulemaking power by a district court.'79 The Court
reasoned that rulemaking power could not be used to effectuate basic
changes in the Rules of Procedure. 8' The Court expanded on the impor-
tance of the Rules:
[T]he choice of procedures adopted to govern various specific
problems arising under the system was in some instances hardly
less significant than the initial decision to have such a system....
' 74 See Crawford-El v. Britton, 951 F.2d 1314, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
'7" Crawford-El v. Britton, 93 F.3d 813, 847 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc)
(Edwards, C.J., concurring).
176 Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 584.
1 See id. at 596-600,
178 Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641 (1960). In Miner, a yacht owner filed a
petition to be exonerated for the drowning deaths of two seamen. Id. at 642. The
trial court issued an order permitting the discovery depositions of various people
to be taken by the survivors of two deceased seamen (pursuant to a local rule
established by the district court). Id. at 642-43. The decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which reversed the trial court's decision,
was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Id. at 643. The Court reasoned that because
the portions of the civil rules relating to discovery depositions were not made a part
of the Admiralty Rules, it could not construe the local court rule to permit a change
so basic. Id. at 650.
179 Id. at 643.
8I Id. at 650.
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[T]he matter is one which, though concededly "procedural," may
be of as great importance to litigants as many a "substantive"
doctrine.... "'
The Court went on to note that strict adherence to the statutory procedures
for the rulemaking authority of the courts is "designed to insure that basic
procedural innovations shall be introduced only after mature consideration
of informed opinion from all relevant quarters, with all the opportunities for
comprehensive and integrated treatment which such consideration
affords."
18 2
On a policy level, a haphazard addition to Rule 56 may guard poorly
the judicial policy, espoused by the Supreme Court in Miner, behind
maintaining a stable canon of the Rules of Procedure. Furthermore, as in
Crawford-El, the decisions of the circuit courts requiring mandatory
judicial notification of summary judgment instructions to pro se litigants
seem to represent "judicial activism at its most extreme"' 83 and are
effectively extending the Federal Rules of Procedure. By creating a notice
requirement above and beyond that which is required in the Rule on the
basis that such notice is needed to ensure pro se litigants equal access to
law, the circuit courts are effectively stripping the district court trial judge
of his discretion to apply provisions in Rules 56(f) and (g) that were
presumably enacted to safeguard the same principles of justice. The
denial of a district court judge's ability to apply procedural safeguards
within his own discretion was struck down in Crawford-El 4 and may not
withstand the scrutiny of the Supreme Court in the summary judgment
context.
C. Requiring District Court Judges to Inform Pro Se Litigants of the
Requirements ofthe Summary Judgment Rule Distorts the Adversarial
System and the Role of Trial Judges
American courts operate under the adversarial system of dispute
resolution.' Under this system, each player in the courtroom performs a
specific role. The judge's role, which is at the heart of the system, is that
I Id. at 649-50.
182 Id. at 650.
183 Crawford-El v. Britton, 93 F.3d 813, 847 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc)
(Edwards, C.J., concurring).184 Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574,584 (1998).
"' See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,490 (1972).
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of a neutral and passive arbiter. 6 Beyond this, "[t]he proper scope of the
court's responsibility [to a pro se litigant] is necessarily an expression of
careful exercise of judicial discretion and cannot be described fully by
specific formula."' 7 However, in order to fulfill the duty of impartiality, a
judge must refrain frombecoming an advocate for thepro se litigant.' 8 The
adversarial system is based on the notions that both parties will be held to
the same standards and that a judge will remain neutral. 9 A rule requiring
judges to give pro se litigants summary judgment instructions threatens to
undermine this system. 9'
Adversarial principles are eroded when a pro se litigant is afforded
special status and a standard of conduct to be followed that would not be
acceptable for an attorney.' Many scholars argue that fundamental to the
view of the adversary system is that the parties are on equal footing, and
therefore, affording pro se litigants special solicitude at the summary
judgment stage will not affect adversarial policies. 92 However, others urge
'
86 See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (1990) ("A Judge
Shall Perform the Duties of Judicial Office Impartially and Diligently.").
187 2 STANDARDS OFJUD. ADMIN., STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL CTS. § 2.23,
Commentary. Moreover, this section's title states: "When litigants undertake to
represent themselves, the court should take whatever measures may be reasonable
and necessary to insure a fair trial."Id. § 2.23.
188 See, e.g., United States v. Trapnell, 512 F.2d 10, 12 (9th Cir.1975) (per
curiam) ("The trial judge is charged with the responsibility of conducting the trial
as impartially and fairly as possible."); Mazur v. Pennsylvania, 507 F. Supp. 3, 4
(E.D. Pa. 1980) ("[A] judge may not become the surrogate attorney for a party,
even one who is proceedingpro se.").
8 9 See generally Scott L. Garland, Avoiding Goliath 's Fate: Defeating a Pro
Se Litigant, 24 LrrTG. 45 (1998).
' See Bradlow, supra note 3, at 671 ("[E]xtending too much procedural
leniency to a pro se litigant risks undermining the impartial role of the judge in the
adversary system."); Id. at 681 ("[P]reserving the impartial role of the judge in the
adversary system.., is an important interest, important enough to justify strict
enforcement of compliance by pro se criminal defendants with procedural rules
under Faretta and Wiggins.").
' See Cornelius D. Helfrich, Facing a Pro Se Opponent, 14 COMPLEAT LAW.
41, 42 (1997) ("In theory, statutes, prevailing case law, and the rules of court apply
to all litigants equally. In practice, this doesn't happen. The lawyer is held to the
standards that the court knows the lawyer is aware of, while frequently the
unrepresented litigant is not held to any standards at all.").
192 See, e.g., McLaughlin, supra note 3, at 1124 ("The effective operation of the
adversary system relies on the assumption that the parties to a lawsuit are
approximately equal in their legal representation. This rough balance, however, is
entirely upset when one side appears pro se.") (footnotes omitted); see also Bounds
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that this has never been an assumption. Judge Posner, in his dissent in
Merrit v. Faulkner,93 states:
We do not put a cap on the amount of money that a litigant can spend on
lawyers; we do not inquire whether the litigants had roughly equal
resources; we allow one to outspend the other by as much as he pleases.
We count on the courts not to be overawed by the litigant with the higher-
priced counsel.194
While a pro se litigant is not necessarily on equal terms with a litigant who
is well represented, he may well be on such terms with a litigant who is
poorly represented. 95 If a represented litigant will be held accountable for
the procedural mistakes of his lawyer, then why afford a pro se litigant
more protection by allowing her to rely on judicial notification of
procedural requirements? The seeming response is that a pro se litigant
should not be afforded such preferential treatment. 96 Requiring particular
v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817,826 (1977); Merrittv. Faulkner, 697 F.2d 761, 764 n.3 (7th
Cir. 1983); Henry J. Friendly, The Courts and Social Policy: Substance and
Procedure, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21, 23-24 (1978).
'93 Merritt, 697 F.2d at 761. In Merritt, the Seventh Circuit found that while
there was no right to counsel for indigent civil litigants, the plaintiffin the suit had
a right to meaningful access to the courts to pursue his claim. Id. at 763. This
included the right to counsel evaluated on a case-by-case basis using several factors
established by the court. See id. at 764.
'"94 Id. at 771 (Posner, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
19 Cf Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 964 (9th Cir. 1998) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) ("[M]any prisoners have greater access to law libraries and legal
assistance" following the Supreme Court's opinion in Hudson v. Hardy, "than do
those without financial means."); Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1364-65 (9th
Cir. 1986) ("[P]ro se litigants in the ordinary civil case should not be treated more
favorably than parties with attorneys of record. Trial courts generally do not
intervene to save litigants from their choice of counsel, even when the lawyer loses
the case because he fails to file opposing papers. A litigant who chooses himself
as legal representative should be treated no differently. In both cases, the remedy
to the party injured by his representative's error is to move to reconsider or to set
aside; it is not for the trial court to inject itself into the adversary process on behalf
of one class of litigant.") (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
" See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834-35 n.46 (1975); Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (per curiam); United States ex rel. Smith v.
Pavich, 568 F.2d 33, 40 (7th Cir. 1978) ("The fact that a defendant represents
himself does not alter the judicial role nor does it impose any new obligation on the
trial judge."); Unites States v. Pinkey, 548 F.2d 305, 311 (10th Cir. 1977) ("He
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ized summary judgment instructions for pro se litigants goes against the
great weight of policy within the courts to hold pro se litigants to substan-
tially the same standards as non-pro se litigants. 97 Additionally, the judicial
who proceeds pro se with full knowledge and understanding of the risks does so
with no greater rights than a litigant represented by a lawyer, and the trial court is
under no obligation to become an 'advocate' for or to assist and guide the pro se
layman through the trial thicket"); see also Ira P. Robbins & Susan N. Herman,
Pro Se Litigation-Litigating Without Counsel: Faretta or For Worse, 42 BROOK.
L.REV. 629,681-82 (1976) (judge not properparty to represent the pro se litigant);
Westling & Rasmussen, supra note 107, at 310 (it is not the job of the court to
represent the litigant); cf Guidroz v. Lynaugh, 852 F.2d 832, 834 (5th Cir. 1988);
Golden v. Newsome, 755 F.2d 1478, 1480 n.4 (1 th Cir. 1985).
197 See, e.g., LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 1995)
("Granted, appellate courts generally do not hold pro se litigants rigidly to the
formal briefing standards set forth in Fed. R. App. P. 28. Nonetheless, we need not
manufacture claims of error for an appellant proceedingpro se, especially when he
has raised an issue below and elected not to pursue it on .appeal.") (citation
omitted); Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985)
(Requiring pro se complaints to be constructed generously, but within limits. "It
does not require those courts to conjure up questions never squarely presented to
them... Nor should appellate courts permit those same fleeting references to
preserve questions on appeal.... To do so... would also transform the district
court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking
out the strongest arguments. .. ."); United States v. Trapnell, 512 F.2d 10, 12 (9th
Cir. 1975) (per curiam) ("For the trial judge to assume the responsibility of
examining witnesses for either party would change the judicial role from one of
impartiality to one of advocacy."); United States v. Dujanovic, 486 F.2d 182, 188
(9th Cir. 1973) ("[O]ne of the penalties of the appellant's self-representation is that
he is bound by his own acts and conduct and held to his record."); Watts v. United
States, 273 F.2d 10, 11-12 (9th Cir. 1959) (defendant representing himself cannot
be heard to complain that his Sixth Amendment rights have been violated); Young
v. Jenne, 661 F. Supp. 1, 3 (S.D. Miss. 1986) (noting that the policy of construing
pro se complaints liberally is outweighed by the policy of denying a motion to
amend a complaint "submitted a full year after the filing of the original complaint,
which asserts new allegations not germane to the original action, and which, if
allowed, would cause prejudice to the non-moving party or undue delay in the
proceedings"); Hamilton v. Jamieson, 355 F. Supp. 290,298 (E.D. Pa. 1973) ("We
are not required, however, to stretch our imagination to manufacture allegations to
supplement the complaint or to assume facts inconsistent with it after finding that
the facts alleged preclude relief. In consideringpro se complaints, we will not hold
them to a high standard in pleading matters of law, and will liberally infer facts
whichpro se plaintiffs through lack of knowledge and experience might omit We
will not, however, infer facts as important, basic, and obvious as those necessary
here to avoid the defense of the statute of limitations.").
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mandate creates even greater incentive for pro se litigants to rely on their
pro se status to excuse mistakes made during trial, excuses not available to
represented litigants. 198 The unfortunate result of a judicial responsibility
to provide pro se litigants with particularized summary judgment instruc-
tions is that it indeed advances pro se parties' interests beyond those of
represented parties while at the same time distorting the role of the district
court judge in the trial process.
While providing notice of the summary judgment requirements to pro
se litigants might not place a judge directly in a role as advocate,199 it
creates an air of unfair permissiveness with respect to the pro se litigant
that can permeate an entire court proceeding and may well open the
floodgates to procedural exceptions for pro se litigants at each turn. 2°0 The
"' See, e.g., Akra Direct Mktg. Corp. v. Fingerhut Corp., 86 F.3d 852, 856 (8th
Cir. 1996) (stating that attempt of appellant to hide behind his pro se status will not
avail him, and that pro se litigants are not excused from complying with procedural
requirements); Phillips v. Tobin, 548 F.2d408, 413 (2d Cir. 1976) ("This plaintiff,
under the cloak of apro se applicant, has engaged in conduct in the past which has
evokedjudicial rebuke and reprimand and has demonstrated his complete disregard
of the standards, propriety, discipline or accountability required of members of the
bar.").
'9' See McLaughlin, supra note 3, at 1126 n.104 ("The practice of calling and
examining witnesses approaches judicial advocacy far more than apprising pro se
litigants of their summaryjudgment obligations. By assuming an active role at trial,
the judge inevitably will be perceived by the jury as sponsoring one cause.
Informing pro se litigants of summary judgment obligations merely helps to ensure
that the litigant is heard at trial.") (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
Many courts discussing impermissible judicial advocacy have stated that it is
most important for the judge to preserve an appearance of impartiality in front of
the jury. See Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 86-87 (1976) (The notification
of the obligation is not mentioned at trial. The judge is only furthering the goal of
eliciting the truth.); Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1369 (9th Cir. 1986)
(Reinhardt J., dissenting) (When a judge informs a pro se litigant of a procedural
obligation, the issue of impartiality does not even arise. The informing judge is not
advocating the pro se litigant's claim before the jury.).210 See Terry Carter, Self-Help Speeds Up: While Courts Workto BecomeMore
Friendly to Pro Se Litigants, the Justice System Struggles to Address Difficult
Issues Raised By Their Presence, 87 A.B.A. J. 34, 36-37 (2001) ("Critics say that
some help for pro se litigants-from detailed guidance by court staffers to judges
bending strict rules of evidence---undermines the core of the judicial system and
damages the legal profession itself There is the perception and the mixed message,
they argue, that pro se litigants might have an unfair advantage over those who
bring lawyers to court.... One critic of making it easier for people to represent
themselves in court is Edward P. Ryan Jr., president of the Massachusetts Bar
Association, who calls it 'the fast food approach.' It staves off hunger in the short
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Ninth Circuit, in refusing to extend the grant of summary judgment
instructions to non-prisoners, noted:
Imposing an obligation to give notice of Rule 56's evidentiary
standards would also invite an undesirable, open-ended participation by
the court in the summary judgment process. It is not sensible for the court
to tell laymen that they must file an "affidavit" without at the same time
explaining what an affidavit is; that, in turn impels a rudimentary outline
of the rules of evidence.20 1
Through a judicially-created mandate, the circuit courts strip trial
judges of their discretion in dealing with pro se litigants at the summary
judgment stage. Using discretion, a trial judge can apply the procedural
safeguards provided in Rule 56202 to ensure that meritorious claims brought
by pro se litigants and represented litigants alike achieve resolution in
court.0" Utilizing discretion and procedural safeguards, a trial judge may
take into account a pro se litigant's status without assuming an impermissi-
ble advocatory role.204 The trial judge, under the Rules of Civil Procedure
and common law, properly has broad discretion in applying procedural
standards to achieve justice.0 5 This discretion achieves the greatest level
of procedural fairness in that it allows the court to grant certain leniency to
litigants with meritorious claims while helping a judge "weed out truly
insubstantial lawsuits."20 6
CONCLUSION
It is clear that most circuit courts of appeals eschew granting leniency
to pro se litigants in many areas of procedural compliance.20 7 Maintaining
run, he says, but a steady diet causes other problems later. 'It provides an illusion
ofjustice in the name of simplification,' says Ryan, .. 'but it doesn't provide any
kind of quality.").
201 Jacobsen, 790 F.2d at 1365 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 1365 n.8
(discussing the ambiguity among circuits as to what exactly constitutes sufficient
notice of summary judgment requirements given to pro se litigants).
202 FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
203 See supra notes 130-43 and accompanying text.
214 See Jacobsen, 790 F.2d at 1366 n.10 ("merely taking the pro se status of
litigants into account in determining compliance with technical pleading or
procedural rules does not require the district court to inform the litigant of how to
comply with the federal rules") (emphasis in original).
20' See, e.g., Gardner v. United States, 283 F.2d 580, 581 (10th Cir. 1960) (trial
court may allow questions to witness even before objection is made by opponent).206 Crawford-E1 v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600 (1998).
207See supra notes 69-79.
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procedural integrity in court proceedings is in keeping with the Supreme
Court's statements in McNeil v. United States:2°8 "strict adherence to the
procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee
of evenhanded administration of the law,"2 and inFaretta v. California:21°
"[t]he right of self-representation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the
courtroom. Neither is it a license not to comply with relevant rules of
procedural and substantive law." ' In light of general adherence to
procedural standards by circuit courts and the admonitions of the Supreme
Court regarding this issue, a uniform rule requiring a district court trial
judge to inform a pro se litigant in specific terms of his obligations when
faced with a summary judgment motion is illogical. A more sensible
approach is found in the decisions of the minority of circuit courts that,
after consideration of the explicit nature of Rule 56, as well as the
overriding concern that to provide such instructions would give pro se
litigants an advantage over represented litigants that does not comport with
notions of equal treatment under the law, do not espouse such a rule.21
Indeed, a pro se litigant, like any other, has a right to equal access to
justice, and thus equal access to the courts.213 Access to the courts is
adequately protected at the summary judgment stage by Rule 56.214 The
Rule provides in clear terms the obligations of parties and allows trial
judges to utilize various provisions as safeguards against abuse.21 5 If pro se
notification of summary judgment requirements is needed, it should be
enacted through an amendment to the Rules of Procedure and not through
twisting existing rules and distorting the adversary system.
If deemed appropriate, an amendment to the Rules of Procedure will
likely be required to effect this change because a circuit court of appeals-
created rule requiring district court judges to inform pro se litigants of their
obligation to submit reply affidavits in response to an opponent's motion
for summary judgment is an impermissible and unnecessary addition to the
Rules of Procedure, a misuse of the court's rulemaking powers, and an
illogical infringement on the important discretionary powers of a trial
judge.2 6 Without the ability to exercise discretion on issues involving pro
se litigants, a federal district court trial judge who deals with pro se
20 McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106 (1993).
2'9Id. at 113.
210 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
211 Id. at 835 nA6.
212 See supra notes 100-14 and accompanying text.
213 See supra notes 4-5, 26-30 and accompanying text.
214 See supra notes 115-45 and accompanying text.
215 See supra notes 115-45 and accompanying text.
216 See supra notes 147-206 and accompanying text.
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litigants on a daily basis will be at the mercy of the federal courts of
appeals. The courts of appeals should facilitate the district court judges'
duties, rather than promulgate needless and burdensome rules from on high.
